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Abstract 
This study examined the impact of corporate diversity on corporate social envi-
ronmental disclosure of registered manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The study con-
sidered both industrial and consumer goods firms, respectively, consisting a total 
of 37 firms. A total of 17 firms was selected for this study using purposive random 
sampling spanning the period 2012–2016. While the content analysis technique 
was engaged to ascertain the extent of corporate social environmental disclosure, 
the study adopted the following variables (board size, foreign directors, and gen-
der) as measures for corporate diversity. Findings from the study revealed that 
board size, foreign directors and gender had a significant positive influence on the 
extent of corporate social environmental disclosure of the selected firms. On the 
other hand, the presence of an independent director and non-executive director 
had an insignificant positive influence on corporate social environmental disclo-
sure. Thus, the study recommends that a large and diverse board with experience, 
expertise and women involvement would enhance mandatory environmental audit 
and environmental grievance mechanism report, and if necessary, an ecological 
committee would be established, and also community leader on the board would 
contribute enormously to the going concern of the business.
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate managers were charged with maximizing shareholders 
wealth within legal bounds. The drive of maximizing shareholders 
wealth led to the neglect of other stakeholders such as the society, 
plant, ecosystem and the environment where the business is situ-
ated (Balabanis, Philips, & Lyall, 1998; Uwuigbe, et al., 2017). This 
idea was rather short lived at the advent of an increasing industrial 
revolution, having so much impact on the host community, rang-
ing from global warming, large emission of greenhouse gases, and 
disposal of toxic wastes, which stirred up stakeholder’s interest on 
corporate environmental reporting (Anderson, 1989). Today, cor-
porate social and environmental reporting has become a crucial 
and voluntary global reporting initiative adopted by most devel-
oped countries across the globe, nevertheless developing country 
such as Nigeria is yet to fully ascribe to this environmental con-
cerns (Azzone, Manzini, & Noci, 1996). Ismail and Ibrahim (2008) 
opined that corporate social environmental reporting (CSER) in 
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Jordan has experienced a creeping growth in implementation by corporations. Thereby, resulting 
in stakeholder’s lack of public awareness, high violation of local community rights despite new sets 
of regulations governing business operations. However, developing economies like Nigeria share 
similar experiences.
The outburst of corporate social environmental disclosure has helped to solve environmental is-
sues ranging from environmental pollution, environmental litigation to proper environmental ac-
counting and reporting. However, the success of this reporting also led to global concern on how 
to harmonize accounting and environmental reporting costs and liabilities (Pramanik, Shil, & Das, 
2008). Notwithstanding the challenges of harmonizing accounting and environmental reporting 
costs, Thomas and Hunger (2008) as cited in Tareq, Reza, and Hassan (2017) opined that corpora-
tions should strive to be socially responsible, because building a good image is key to the survival 
of a business, and when this is done, it transcends to a long-lasting relationship with diverse stake-
holders, which is ideal for a perpetual and sustainable business environment.
Traditionally, corporate social environmental engagement has drawn lots of attention recently, but 
social environmental disclosure report is voluntary in nature. However, the voluntary nature of 
such reports could mere the credibility of this report reason been that some organization may not 
be willing to disclose such information or rather not disclose at all or partially disclose environ-
mental information. In the context of Nigeria, we could observe lots of companies not fully provid-
ing adequate social environmental information in their annual reports. However, this study seeks 
to find out what could be responsible for this poor participation by Nigerian firms. Sharfman and 
Fernandoi (2008), Mgbame (2012) as cited in Ndukwu and John (2015) opined that factors such as 
leverage, industry type, profitability, firms size could possibly inf luence organizations to voluntar-
ily engage in social environmental disclosures. Having suggested this by Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), Mgbame (2012), the cultural orientation of countries also could be responsible for the poor 
response.
However, lots of works have scrutinized the inf luence of board composition on company econom-
ic performance with less attention to non-financial performance indicators (Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003; Rose, 2007) as cited in Kathyayini Rao, Tilt, and Lester (2016). The diversity and 
composition of members on the board with relevant skills, technical intelligence, and external ex-
posure would facilitate quality and a more improved decision-making process, aimed at increasing 
the level of company’s policy towards corporate social and environmental disclosure (Strandberg, 
2005; Mackenzie, 2007). In the same vein, Alfken, Bellar, and Helms (2004) as cited in Lilik, 
Bambang, Sutrisna, and Erwin (2014) asserted that the absence of board diversity led to the failure 
and weakness of governance in corporations and admonished that a diverse board would enhance 
the quality of decision making at top level management, promote high ethical standards, reduce 
narrow-minded decisions, and improve corporate strategic planning and accountability. Corkery 
and Taylor (2012) opined that corporate diversity and equal representation on the board would en-
courage better ethical behavior and reduce fraud so as to greatly reduce agency cost. However, a gap 
in literature exists on how a corporately diverse board would impact the level of the firm`s social 
environmental reporting in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy.
To answer the question raised, the arrangement of this study will take this particular order. The first 
section of the paper reflects well develop and examine extant literature. The second part explains the 
empirical data collection method used for the analysis. Furthermore, data derived would be analyzed. 
However, we present a discussion, conclusions and recommendations for imminent research.
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
1.1. Corporate diversity 
Corporate diversity has so much influence on the 
quality of the board (Kruger, 2007; Osariemen et 
al., 2018). Diversity would foster conflict of inter-
est, different opinion, and knowledge, but all these 
shortfalls are considered ideal for a good board 
composition aimed at providing quality and value 
of organization decision-making process geared 
toward improving the level of environmental 
disclosure (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003). Another school 
(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008) opined that 
board diversity could be determine using demo-
graphic classification which consists of age, na-
tionality, ethnicity, gender, educational history, 
work experience, and organizational member-
ship. However, Jackson et al. (2003) had a contra-
ry opinion that both schools are making emphasis 
on the same measure on diversity, that a quality 
board should ensure multiple diversity dynamism 
purposely to safeguard the dynamic needs of vari-
ous parties (stakeholders). 
1.2. Corporate social environmental 
disclosure 
Corporate social environmental disclosure can be 
broken down into two constructs, namely social 
information and environmental information, re-
spectively, and the major drive is to ensure that 
both societal and environmental performance of 
an organization is well disclosed to its stakehold-
ers (Thompson & Zarina, 2004). Social disclosure 
consists of releasing information geared at en-
hancing human resources in form of workers skill 
acquisitions, improvement, wellbeing and security, 
equal privilege and wages fairness, tailoring con-
sumers concerns (customer well-being and secu-
rity, consumers criticisms and compliance with 
product laws), safeguarding human right (free-
doms to express ourselves, non-discrimination), 
and tailoring other concerns of various stakehold-
ers and community members by reducing corrup-
tion, enacting policies to frown at any form of un-
healthy competition and conform with stated law 
(GRI, 2011). Environmental reporting covers the 
efficient use of materials and recycling methods, 
direct and indirect energy consumption, perse-
veration of bio-diversity lifespan, possible policies 
towards reducing and treating of emissions, efflu-
ent, resources and waste management, and efforts 
made to reduce product and services environ-
mental ill effects (GRI, 2011). However, the term 
“corporate social environmental disclosure” is a 
deliberate step taken by an organization to exten-
sively provide information on a symbiotic associa-
tion between the firm activities and its immediate 
environments. 
1.3. Theoretical framework 
There is various literature having identical onto-
logical views on corporate social environmental 
accounting such as the legitimacy, stakeholder, 
agency and resources dependency theory. Chen 
and Robert (2010) opined that the theories stat-
ed are system centred theories, which claim every 
firm is influenced by their immediate environ-
ment in which they are located, therefore deliber-
ate efforts should be made by these organizations 
to reduce risk and ensure long-term sustainability 
and growth. This work would use the resource de-
pendency theory as the theory that would guide 
the paper in lieu of finding out the effect a corpo-
rate diverse board has on the quality of social en-
vironmental reporting of registered manufactur-
ing companies on the Nigerian stock market. 
1.4. Resource dependency theory
Resource dependency theory provides an insight 
on how firms are responsible for contributing to 
the firms’ internal and external benefits. Preffer 
and Salancik (1978) as cited in Lilik, Bambang, 
Sustrisno, and Erwin (2014) opined that compa-
nies influence business environment by selecting 
resources useful to their going concern (existence). 
In line with this view, Lynall, Golden, and Hilman 
(2003) were of the opinion that businesses are open 
system affected by its environment, and to attain a 
long-term existence, the quality of the board must 
play a very crucial role in harmonizing diverse in-
terest of stakeholders. Duztas (2008) asserted that 
the selection of resources used up by the organi-
zation is determined by the board. Therefore, the 
quality of the board would help strike a balance be-
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tween the interest of the company and that of the 
business environment. Carpenter, Geletkanycz, 
and Sanders (2004), Selsky and Parker (2005) 
avowed that corporate board are also resources 
that bring on expertise, experience, ideas and a set 
of experience board would help build a formidable 
relationship with its stakeholders and external en-
vironment targeted at a long-term sustainability.
1.5. Agency theory 
Agency theory creates a structure that links cor-
porate diversity to social environmental reporting. 
This theory expresses the interplay of contractual 
agreement that exists between an agent (manager) 
and the owner of the investment. The agent (direc-
tors) are in charge of supervising and monitoring 
the internal affairs and the management of man-
agers on behalf of shareholder and stakeholders 
(Mclkenny & Ben-Amar, 2015; Uwuigbe, 2017). 
The theory suggests that a more diverse board 
would reduce the chances of agency cost.
1.6. Agency theory and board size
Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) opined that the 
size of a board has a higher propensity of improv-
ing the voluntary information including environ-
mental disclosure, agency theorist are of the opin-
ion that a more diverse board would possess more 
expertise, qualities and core competence needed 
to ensure adequate monitoring and supervisory 
of management (Larmou & Vafeas, 2010; Uwigbe, 
Egbide, & Ayokunle, 2011; Salama, Sun Hussainey, 
& Habbash, 2010; Olubukola et al., 2016). In line 
with Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), they avowed 
that a large board composition has a higher prox-
imity of increasing the volume of directors who 
are experienced in financial and accounting mat-
ters, thereby enhancing company social environ-
mental information. Empirical studies carried 
out by Haji (2012), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), 
Hidalgo, Garcia-Meca, and Martinez (2011) all at-
tested that a larger board influences the quality of 
environmental information. Furthermore, Sadia 
et al. (2015) found a positive and strong relation-
ship between the board size and the level of social 
environmental disclosure in Pakistan spanning 
the period 2007–2011. This findings collaborate 
the work of Ezhilareasi and Kabra (2017) in China 
spanning the period 2009–2015. 
In a similar context, Jensen (1993) opined that a 
larger board does not guaranty effectiveness and 
could be manipulated by the CEO when com-
pared to a smaller board. He opined that a larger 
board has a higher proximity to supervizing and 
controlling activities notwithstanding, but can 
be outweighed when compared with the cost of 
poor communication and delay in verdict making. 
Kathyayini et al. (2012) asserted that the quality of 
the content disclosed needs to be properly com-
municated and coordinated in an effective and 
efficient manner amongst board members. Hence, 
larger board could reflect an adverse effect on the 
quality content of environmental reporting. These 
arguments were supported by empirical studies 
such as Bouaziz (2014) and UwUigbe et al. (2011) 
who opined that a larger board would create room 
for free riders which would make agency problem 
to be on a rise. Saha and Akter (2013), and Arcay 
and Vazquez (2005) as cited in Halil (2016) car-
ried out an empirical study to ascertain the influ-
ence a large board has on deliberate disclosure, but 
conclude that a non-significant relationship exists 
amid both variables under study. Therefore, a de-
viation exists between the theoretical framework 
and the empirical findings.
Ho1: There is no significant association between 
board size and the extent of corporate social 
environmental reporting.
1.7. Agency theory and board 
independence
Board independence is a crucial corporate govern-
ance structure that determines an organization 
extent of social environmental reporting (Khan, 
Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2014). The board usually 
consists of both dependent directors and inde-
pendent directors. Independent directors are the 
minority interest group (shareholders), because 
they do not engage in the daily activities of the 
board they are mere ally with their executive po-
sition (Mohamad & Sulong, 2010; Rouf, 2011), the 
dependent directors who have a larger involve-
ment with the firm’s activities.
Agency theory opined an increase in the pro-
portion of independent director would prompt 
an increase in effectively controlling and mon-
itoring the board and management, respective-
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ly (Chau & Gray, 2010). Sharif and Rashid (2014), 
Khan (2010) asserted that a higher percentage of 
non-dependent executives present would create a 
balance of interest and ensure that company’s pol-
icies and programs capture the interest of share-
holders, stakeholders and the environment at 
large. Furthermore, Alhassan and Basariah (2016) 
averred that enlightened independent directors 
would improve environmental reporting. 
In line with the theory, Uwuigbe et al. (2011) as 
cited in Halil (2016) avowed that corporate so-
cial environmental reporting would only see the 
limelight by having a larger proportion of out-
sider directors other empirical studies align with 
this claims are (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005).
Ho2: There is no relationship between independ-
ent and non-executive directors on the level 
of corporate social environmental reporting.
1.8. Agency theory and gender 
diversity
It would interest you to know that the male gen-
der differs from the female gender culturally and 
socially, and these changes tend to trigger the rele-
vance of women participation on the quality of en-
vironmental reporting (Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2014). 
An increased percentage of females on the board 
would foster business interactions resulting to an 
increase in environmental information (Barako 
& Brown, 2008). Bowrin (2013) averred that ad-
equate representation of female would improve 
company diversity, socio-economic interaction 
with the business environment (Natividad, 2005). 
Went further to amplify the need for female direc-
tor saying that the psychological and compassion-
ate attribute makes them stand up for less power-
ful stakeholders. Furthermore, Diamantopoulos 
et al. (2003), Rahman and Post (2012) all averred 
that most female directors pay more attention to 
social activities relating to donations, education-
al supports and aids to non-governmental institu-
tions, rather than environmental issues. However, 
Alazzani, Hassanein, and Aljanadi (2017) found a 
positive relationship amid social performance and 
female directors on the board in Malaysian firms. 
This findings all collaborates the work of Dienes 
and Velte (2016), Kılıç, Kuzey, and Uyar (2015). 
Consequently, Konrad, Kramer, and Erkut (2008) 
carried out a research and discovered that the 
presence of only one woman on the board under-
mines her willingness to freely express her opin-
ion on environmental issues and the involvement 
of more than one would participate formidably. In 
concordance with it Ruply et al. (2012) avowed that 
women present in a company structure would in-
fluence deliberately social environmental report-
ing. Bernardi and Threadgill (2010), Gallén and 
Perait (2017), asserted that gender diversity has 
the ability to enhance decision-making process 
and provide better information on dealing with 
environmental and ethical issues, respectively.
Ho3: There is no relationship between the presence 
of women on the board and the level of cor-
porate social environmental disclosure.
1.9. Foreign directors
The agency theorists are of the opinion that a 
more diverse board with expertise and experience 
would reduce future agency problems and ensure 
that owner` s resources are managed effective-
ly. The foreign directors considered in the study 
are personnel from developed countries that pay 
more interest on social environmental matters. In 
the same vein, they are willing to transfer such 
acquired knowledge to the domestic developing 
countries such as Nigeria. Fields and Keys (2003) 
are of the opinion that for an organization to ac-
quire diverse innovations, skills, ideas, it should 
employ the services of individuals from different 
parts of the world. Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015) 
are of the opinion that foreign director’s expertise 
and experience over time would improve firm’s 
performance, because they have better exposure 
on global happenings and they are not influenced 
by domestic directors and this would ensure ef-
fective monitoring of information being disclosed. 
In the same vein, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012) 
opined that the exposure, skills and knowledge 
power of a foreign board member would increase 
the chances of the firm identifying new business 
opportunities, expansion and detailed informa-
tion on the environment. Giannetti et al. (2015) 
opined that a positive relationship exists between 
returnee managers on corporate social perfor-
mance, he went further to say that board of direc-
tors with foreign exposure and experience would 
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replicate such level of experiences in governance 
and management of decision-making processes, 
which would have an effect on the level and quali-
ty of environmental information. 
Khan (2010) carried out a research in Bangladesh 
Bank and opined that foreign directors in the 
board improved the quality of banks social en-
vironmental information. In disparity, a similar 
case of Kenya banks responded otherwise. This 
was found in a work carried out by Barako and 
Brown (2008) who opined that foreign directors 
in the board has no influence on the social and 
environmental disclosure made by the banks. He 
further went on to buttress his claims by assum-
ing that the foreign directors would have a major 
objective, which is to protect the interest of the 
foreign owners rather than focus on voluntary 
disclosures.
Ho4: There is no relationship between foreign di-
rectors in the board and the quality of corpo-
rate social environmental disclosure.
2. MATERIALS  
AND METHODS
An ex-post facto research approach was adopted in 
order to attain the objectives of the study. This sec-
tion discusses the modalities adopted in the develop-
ment of the study. It includes the population, sample, 
data collection, measurement of the variables.
2.1. Sample selection, data collection 
and analysis
In order to attain the overall objective of this 
study, seventeen (17) firms were selected from a 
total of thirty seven (37) listed industrial and con-
sumer goods firm spanning through the period 
2012–2016. The choice of these seventeen compa-
nies was based on their frequent tracks or traits 
of a constantly high level of production capaci-
ty, which could possibly affect the environment 
in which these companies are located (Oyeshola, 
2008). Based on this specification, and guided by 
Kerjice and Morgan (1970) assumptions as cited 
in Uwuigbe, Olusanmi, and Iyoha (2015) who are 
of the opinion that a minimum of 5% of a well-de-
fined population is considered a sufficient sample 
size suitable for generalization. In lieu of Kerjice 
and Morgan (1970), seventeen manufacturing 
firms were selected (see appendix for sampled 
firms). This study relies solely on listed firms be-
cause of the ease of accessing company’s annual 
report and because these companies are obliged 
to do so annually. However, content analysis was 
used to capture the extent of the sampled firm’s 
social environmental disclosure. The Eviews sta-
tistical software was used to analyze the data.
2.2. Development of corporate social 
environmental disclosure index
This reflects the dependent variable in this study 
and was derived from the manufacturing firms’ 
corporate annual reports and official website span-
ning through the period 2012–2016. Extant liter-
ature have appraised Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) as a fore-runner for social environmental 
disclosure and many other sustainable report-
ing (Daizy & Das, 2014). However, GRI has cer-
tain weaknesses as one of them has not been in-
dustry-specific, notwithstanding these challenges, 
this work used the GRI template and other extant 
literature works checklist experiencing similar sit-
uation with Nigeria (developing economies). This 
gave rise to an eighteen (18) checklist adopted for 
this study (see template in Appendix). However, 
the unweighing approach was used to score dis-
closed items in order to ensure that all items are 
adequately represented and free from subjec-
tivity and bias, items not disclosed are scored 0, 
while items disclosed are scored 1. Prior works 
that adopted the unweight method in counting 
disclosed items includes Hamid and Atan (2011), 
Amran and Haniffa (2011), Esa and Ghazali (2012), 
Ahmad and Haraf (2013), and Haji (2013), as cited 
in Michelle Phua Siew Huei (2016).
The CED checklist was derived from earlier re-
searchers and GRI standards, all items on the list 
are allotted a mark of 1, if disclosed in the yearly 
reports, or 0 mark, if absent. As soon as every item 
is allotted marks, the marks are then summed up 
to examine the extent of items disclosed in each 
sampled firm. The summed items are then alien-
ated by the entire sum of items as contained in the 
checklist in order to determine the percentage to 
which the sampled firms disclose their environ-
mental activities. This is calculated as follows:
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  ’     100%,
       
CED The sum of items disclosed
in the firm s yearly report
Total number of items on the disclosed list
=
⋅
2.3. Independent variables 
(corporate diversity)
The corporate diversity is considered the autono-
mous variables in this work, which include gender 
diversity, board independence, size of the board, 
and foreign director. The information on corpo-
rate diversity is derived from the yearly reports 
of these firms. Board size (BSIZE) is determined 
by the actual directors present yearly. Board inde-
pendence (BIND) is calculated by the percentage 
of independent and non-executive to board size. 
Foreign director (FD) is calculated by dividing the 
proportion of non-Nigerians on the board by the 
total board members, gender diversity (GD) was 
ascertained as a proportion of female executives 
on the total number of executives on the board.
2.4. Model specification
The study has certain hypotheses stated above, 
hence, the model was adopted from the work 
(Halil, 2016) in order to examine the level in which 
a corporately diverse board has on the quality of 
social environmental reporting.
The equation is calculated implicitly as follows:
( ),  ,  ,  ,it it it it itCSED f BSIZE BIND GD FD=  (1)
where i  – number of observations, t  – time pe-
riod, 
itCSED  – is calculated by adopting the 18 
environmental checklist items guided by GRI, 
itBSIZE  – represents the size of the board pres-
ent yearly, 
itBIND  – represents the fraction of 
independent and non-executive directors divid-
ed by the actual executives on the board yearly, 
itGD  – represents the proportion of women ex-
ecutives divided by the actual executives on the 
board yearly, 
itFD  – represent the proportion 
of non-Nigerian directors divided by the entire 
board members.
To ensure that the model identified above con-
tain statically significant variables, we used 
stepwise-backwards procedure. Under this 
method, the variables are first included in the 
model, then variables are removed based on 
the p-value criterion. Hence, the variables with 
p-value higher than the set criterion are re-
moved. The result of this section technique is 
shown in Table 2.
The results of the stepwise regression show that 
the BIND (board independence) variable is not 
statistically significant to the model, therefore, it 
was removed. The model can be rewritten and ex-
pressed explicitly as follows:
1
2 3
,
it i t it
it it it
CSED BSIZE
GD FD µ
β δ β
β β
=
+
+
+
+ +
+  (2)
where i  – denotes firms specific, t  – denotes the 
deterministic time trend, 
itµ  – denotes the esti-
mated residual.
Validity and reliability 
The data were derived from each of the sampled 
firm annual reports and official website, howev-
er, content analysis was used to determining the 
Table 1. Measurement
Variable Item (proxies) Measurement
Dependent Corporate social environmental disclosure (CSED) Total items disclosed/maximum (18) items (see Appendix A)
Independent
Board size (BSIZE) Actual directors on the company structure yearly
Board independence (BIND) Percentage of independent and non-executive directors alienated by the entire sum of directors present yearly
Gender diversity (GD) The proportion of women directors divided by the Actual executives on the board
Foreign director (FD) The percentage of a non-Nigerians on the board divided by the total board members
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extent of the sampled firm social environmental 
disclosure. The checklist used to ascertain the ex-
tent disclosure was derived from global reporting 
initiative and used in the works of Michelle (2016), 
Ahmad and Haraf (2013), Haji (2013), Halil (2016).
3. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The result from the descriptive statistics as shown 
below in Table 3 presents a mean on corporate 
social environmental disclosure of .54575 of the 
selected manufacturing companies under study. 
This shows an average percentage distribution of 
54.5%, based on the figure obtained from these 
firms’ annual report a range of 0.2 to 0.944 var-
iation exist in the level of these firms’ environ-
mental reports, which reflect that more attention 
is paid to the quality of environmental report-
ing from these selected firms. In the same vein, 
the independent variables, which are the BSIZE, 
GENDER, FOREIGN DIRECTORS, show an av-
erage mean value of 10.58, .634, .16 and .323, sep-
arately, from the sampled industries. The result 
of the average board size indicates that about 11 
persons are on the board. The board size num-
ber corresponds with Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requirement. Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) clearly states that the 
board size must have at most six directors on the 
board and at least twenty directors. However, the 
gender and foreign directors show that female di-
rectors constitute about 16%, and 32% is for for-
eign directors, respectively, of the sampled firm. 
Furthermore, the histogram normality chart 
clearly depicts that the data used for this study 
were normally distributed. However, this is seen 
by 0.11 greater than the 5% significance level.
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of the in-
dependent and dependent variables, respective-
ly. It  clearly depict that a linear association ex-
ists amid the explanatory variables. According to 
Gujarati (2004), multicollinearity could only be 
a problem if the pair-wise correlation coefficient 
among regressors is above 0.80. However, this in-
dependent variable in this study is free from any 
visible traits of multicollinearity. Consequently, 
the result shows that board size (BSIZE) has firm 
and positive relationship with corporate social en-
vironmental disclosure. Subsequently, foreign di-
rector (FD) and gender (GD) follow.
Interpretation
The Hausman test was carried out to determine 
which model is appropriate for the panel regres-
sion. The fixed effects treat both 
iα  and tδ  as re-
Table 2. Stepwise regression
Source: E-VIEWS output (2018).
Dependent variable: CSEDI
Included observations: 85
Number of always included regressors: 1
Number of search regressors: 4
Selection method: stepwise backwards
Stopping criterion: p-value forwards/backwards = 0.05/0.05
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic Prob.*
C –0.322695 0.096478 –3.344748 0.0012
BSIZE 0.060756 0.007812 7.777195 0.0000
GENDER 0.866844 0.129988 6.668647 0.0000
FD 0.241031 0.105397 2.286900 0.0248
R-squared 0.543172 Mean dependent var 0.545752
Adjusted R-squared 0.526252 S.D. dependent var 0.270429
S.E. of regression 0.186134 Akaike info criterion –0.478781
Sum squared resid 2.806325 Schwarz criterion –0.363832
Log likelihood 24.34818 Hannan-Quinn criter. –0.432545
F-statistic 32.10318 Durbin-Watson stat 0.766373
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000
Selection summary
Removed BIND
237
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Source: Calculated by the researchers using the E-VIEWS 9 (2016).
Variable CSEDI BSIZE GENDER FD
Mean 0.545752 10.58824 0.169787 0.323472
Median 0.388889 10.00000 0.125000 0.285714
Maximum 0.944444 17.00000 0.750000 0.777778
Minimum 0.222222 7.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Std. Dev. 0.270429 2.638064 0.158457 0.192922
Skewness 0.429971 1.027389 1.270212 0.353026
Kurtosis 1.516464 3.293137 4.890157 2.522967
Jarque-Bera 10.41384 15.25765 35.51033 2.571499
Probability 0.005479 0.000486 0.000000 0.276443
Sum 46.38889 900.0000 14.43188 27.49511
Sum Sq. Dev. 6.143065 584.5882 2.109112 3.126379
Observations 85 85 85 85
Figure 1. Histogram normality
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2012–2016
Observations 85
Mean 1.46e-16
Median –0.031261
Maximum 0.529807
Minimum –0.380857
Std. Dev. 0.180770
Skewness 0.537120
Kurtosis 3.252808
Jarque-Bera 4.313402
Probability 0.115706
Table 4. Correlation matrix
Source: Calculated by the researchers using the E-VIEWS 9 (2016).
Correlation CSEDI BSIZE FD GEN
CSEDI 1.000000 – – –
BSIZE 0.516211 1.000000 – –
FD 0.183389 0.043867 1.000000 –
GEN 0.404958 –0.165410 –0.028666 1.000000
Table 5. Hausman test
Source: Calculated by the researchers using the E-VIEWS 9 (2016).
Correlated random effects – Hausman test
Equation: untitled
Test period random effects
Test summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Period random effects 3.414077 3 0.3321
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gression parameters, whereas random effects treat 
them as components of the error term. However, 
the Hausman test rule states that if the p-value is 
statistically significant, the alternative hypothesis 
(fixed effects model) is accepted, whereas, if the 
p-value isn’t statistically significant, the null hy-
pothesis (random effects model) is accepted.
From the analysis, it is seen that the p-value 
(0.3321) 5% significance level, so the null hypoth-
esis is accepted, which advocates that the random 
effects model is greater than be used for the re-
gression analysis.
Table 6. Regression result for (panel fixed effects 
can estimation)
Source: Compiled by researcher using E-VIEWS 9.
Variables Fixed effects Random effects
BSIZE 0.0629542***(7.914699)
0.060756***
(7.749015)
FD 0.264178**(2.475776)
0.241031**
(2.278614)
GENDER 0.901495**(6.819119)
0.866844***
(6.644484)
C –0.354971(–3.607011)
–0.322695***
(–3.332628)
R-squared 0.562567 0.543172
F-statistic 14.14671 32.10318
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000
Hausman statistics 0.3321 –
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01.
4. DISCUSSION OF PANEL 
REGRESSION RESULT
The random effects model was considered more 
suitable model for the panel regression analysis. 
However, using the random effects model from the 
table above, the independent variables are harmo-
niously capable of explaining about 54% of the se-
lected industries social environmental disclosure, 
which infers that only 54% of the independent vari-
ables are capable of predicting our dependent varia-
bles. The remaining percent can be ascribed to oth-
er factors not considered in this study. Furthermore, 
the Fisher ratio shows a p-value less than 0.05 (i.e. 
0.000000 < 0.05); this implies that the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the depend-
ent variables is linear, also buttressing that the in-
dependent variables are simultaneously and signifi-
cantly associated with the dependent variable.
Table 6 depicts the relationships between the ex-
planatory variables and the dependent variable as 
used in this study. Findings for the first hypothe-
sis (there is no relationship between the board size 
and the extent of social environmental reporting) 
show that a positive relationship between exists 
the size of the board and the extent of social en-
vironmental disclosure of the selected industries. 
This is evident in the t- statistics value of 7.74 and 
a p-value less than 0.01 level of significance. This 
result indicates that the null hypothesis is reject-
ed, while the alternate hypothesis is accepted. 
However, the addition of a director on the board 
would improve social environmental reporting by 
0.060756, which also buttresses the claim that a 
more diverse board would possess more expertise, 
qualities and core competence needed to ensure 
adequate monitoring and supervision of man-
agement that would improve the quality of their 
corporate social environmental information to 
its stakeholders. This outcome corroborates the 
findings of Larmou and Vafeas (2010), Ntim et al. 
(2013), Elzahar and Husaney (2012), where they 
opined the fact that an increased board size has a 
higher proximity of increasing the volume of di-
rectors who are experienced in financial and ac-
counting matters, thereby enhancing the quality 
and quantity of corporate social and environmen-
tal reporting.
Findings, as it relates to the second hypothesis 
(there is no relationship between the presence of 
women on the board and the level of corporate 
social environmental disclosure), show that the 
presence of women on the board has a significant 
influence on the level of voluntary information 
actually disclosed by firms. This is evident in the 
t-statistics of (6.64) and a p-value less than 0.01 
level of significance, respectively. This outcome 
suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis, while 
the alternative hypothesis is accepted and clearly 
depicts that the presence of at least one woman 
on board would improve the social environmen-
tal disclosure by 0.866844. It further implies that 
the presence of a minimum of three women at the 
top level management will help improve the sam-
pled firms’ social environmental disclosure. This 
outcome is in line with the findings of Kramer, 
Konrad, and Erkut (2008), where they averred 
that the presence of only one woman on the board 
undermines her willingness to freely express her 
239
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
opinion on environmental issues and the involve-
ment of more than one would participate formi-
dably. Bernardi and Threadgill (2010) also assert-
ed that gender diversity has the ability to improve 
the value creation and provide better information 
on dealing with environmental and ethical issues, 
respectively.
Findings, as it relates to the third hypothesis, 
which states that there is no significant associ-
ation between a foreign director on the board 
and the level of corporate social environmen-
tal disclosure, presents foreign experts on the 
board to have a significant positive inf luence 
on the voluntary reporting of the company. The 
t-statistics value of 2.27 and a p-value less than 
0.01 level of significance support these findings. 
Hence, the null hypothesis was rejected. This 
outcome further suggests that as the number of 
foreign executives on top-level management in-
creases, the level of voluntary disclosure would 
be enhanced, however, this is evident by the 
co-efficient of 0.241031. This result is in line 
with the work of Barako and Brown (2008) and 
contradicts the findings of Giannetti, Liao, and 
Yu (2015) and Khan (2010). 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This work assessed the effect of corporate diversity on social environmental disclosure of listed manu-
facturing companies on the Nigerian stock market. Nevertheless, drawing from the hypotheses tested, 
the findings of this work revealed that all the stated corporate diversity proxies had a positive relation-
ship with the company’s social environmental reporting. The paper discovered that most of the sampled 
firms do not have an environmental audit report, and environmental grievance mechanism to provide 
a clear yardstick to examine the quality of their social environmental engagement. On the premises of 
this stated points, the paper concludes that listed industrial and consumer goods firms need to come out 
with ideas on how to tackle the direct effect of their activities on its immediate environment and must 
provide a symbiotic report. The paper therefore recommends that a large and diverse board with expe-
rience, expertise and women involvement would enhance mandatory environmental audit and envi-
ronmental grievance mechanism report, and, if necessary, an ecological team in the company would be 
established, and possibly a community leader on the board would contribute enormously to corporate 
legitimacy and ensure corporate survival and success, as asserted by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Sadia, 
Tariq, and Saba (2015). The paper only focused on two manufacturing firms, which are the industrial 
and consumer goods firms listed on the stock market. Other researchers could consider other sectors 
and other corporate diversity proxies not used in the study.
NOVELTY AND CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This study contributes to knowledge by providing new dimension on the impact/role of gender 
and foreign directors in the disclosure of corporate social environmental information in Nigeria. 
Finding in this study makes a contribution by providing a detailed insight on the environmental 
disclosure level of manufacturing firms. Finally, the novelty of this study is demonstrated in the 
model, as it adds to existing literature on the role of gender and foreign in corporate environmental 
disclosure.
FURTHER STUDIES
Considering the fact that this study only looked that at the manufacturing companies (17 firms the in-
dustrial goods and consumer goods) in Nigeria is a major limitation for this study. Hence, this study 
suggests that future research in this area could address this salient limitation by examining listed firms 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) including those in the oil sectors of the Nigerian economy that 
are heavily involved gas flaring and high carbon dioxide emission (CO
2
).
240
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Authors acknowledge Covenant University who has solely provided the plate form for this research and 
has also fully sponsored publication of this research work.
REFERENCES
1. Ahmad, N., & Haraf, A. (2013). 
Environmental Disclosure of 
Malaysian Property Development 
Companies: Towards Legitimacy or 
Accountability? Social Responsibility 
Journal, 9, 241-258. https://doi.
org/10.1108/SRJ-10-2011-0090
2. Alazzani, A., Hassanein, A., & 
Aljanadi, Y. (2017). Impact of 
gender diversity on social and 
environmental performance: 
evidence from Malaysia. Corporate 
Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society, 17(2), 
266-283. https://doi.org/10.1108/
CG-12-2015-0161
3. Amran, A., & Haniffa, R. (2011). 
Evidence in Development of 
Sustainability Reporting: A Case 
of a Developing Country. Business 
Strategy and the Environment, 20(3), 
141-156. https://doi.org/10.1002/
bse.672
4. Anderson, J. (1989). Corporate 
Social Reporting. New York: 
Quorum Books. Retrieved from 
https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/18798
444?q&versionId=22068085
5. Arcay, M. R. B., & Vazquez, M. F. M. 
(2005). Corporate characteristics, 
governance rules and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in Spain. 
Advances in Accounting, 21, 299-331.
6. Arfken, D. E., Bellar, S. L., & Helms, 
M. M. (2004). The ultimate glass 
ceiling revisited: The presence 
of women on corporate boards. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 50(2), 
177-186. Retrieved from http://
www.academia.edu/907239/
The_ultimate_glass_ceiling_revis-
ited_The_presence_of_women_on_
corporate_boards
7. Azzone, G., Manzini, R., & Noci, 
G. (1996). Evolutionary Trend in 
Environmental Reporting. Business 
Strategy and the Environment, 
5, 219-230. Retrieved from 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/full/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0836(199612)5:4%3C219::AID-
BSE69%3E3.0.CO;2-K
8. Balabanis, G., Philips, H., & 
Lyall, J. (1998). Corporate Social 
Responsibility & Economic 
Performance in the Top of British 
Companies: Are they linked? 
European Business Review, 98, 
25-44. Retrieved from https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/70ab/
bf7fcb427376a59bbc4c9722c6516
7c7b146.pdf
9. Barako, D. G., & Brown, A. M. 
(2008). Corporate social reporting 
and board representation: evidence 
from the Kenyan banking 
sector. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 12(3), 309-324. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9053-x
10. Ben‐Amar, W., & McIlkenny, P. 
(2015). Board effectiveness and 
the voluntary disclosure of climate 
change information. Business 
Strategy and the Environment, 24(8), 
704-719. Retrieved from https://
econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:bst
rat:v:24:y:2015:i:8:p:704-719
11. Bernardi, R. A., & Threadgill, V. H. 
(2010). Women directors and 
corporate social responsibility. 
Electronic Journal of Business Ethics 
and Organizational Studies, 15(2), 
15-21. Retrieved from https://phil-
papers.org/rec/BERWDA-3
12. Bowrin, A. R. (2013). Corporate 
social and environmental 
reporting in the Caribbean. Social 
Responsibility Journal, 9(2), 259-280. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/SRJ-08-
2011-0074
13. Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. 
(2008). Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom and Firm Financial 
Performance. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 83(3), 435-451. Retrieved 
from https://link.springer.com/ar-
ticle/10.1007/s10551-007-9630-y
14. Carpenter, M., Geletkanycz, M., & 
Sanders, W. (2004). Upper echelons 
research revisited: Antecedents, 
elements, and consequences of top 
management team composition. 
Journal of Management, 30, 747-
778. Retrieved from http://jour-
nals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1016/j.
jm.2004.06.001
15. Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, 
B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The 
gender and ethnic diversity of US 
boards and board committees 
and firm financial performance. 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 18(5), 396-
414. 
16. Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & 
Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate 
governance, board diversity, and 
firm value. Financial Review, 38, 
33-53. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-8683.2010.00809.x 
17. Carter, S., Shaw, E., Lam, W., 
& Wilson, F. (2007). Gender, 
entrepreneurship, and bank 
lending: The criteria and 
processes used by bank loan 
officers in assessing applications. 
Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 31(3), 427-444. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6520.2007.00181.x 
18. Catanzariti, J., & Lo, M. (2011). 
Corporate governance changes focus 
on diversity. Retrieved from http://
www.claytonutz.com/publica-
tions/newsletters/discrimination 
and-diversityinsights/20110511/
corporate_governance_changes_fo-
cus_on_diversity.page (accessed on 
November 12, 2017). 
19. Chau, G., & Gray, S. J. (2010). 
Family ownership, board 
independence and voluntary 
disclosure: Evidence from Hong 
Kong. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 
19(2), 93-109. Retrieved from 
http://ira.lib.polyu.edu.hk/han-
dle/10397/28768
241
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
20. Cheng, E. C., & Courtenay, S. 
M. (2006). Board composition, 
regulatory regime and voluntary 
disclosure. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 41(3), 262-
289. Retrieved from https://econ-
papers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accou
n:v:41:y:2006:i:3:p:262-289
21. Daizy, & Das, N. (2014). 
Sustainability reporting 
framework: Comparative analysis 
of global reporting initiatives and 
dow jones sustainability index. 
International Journal of Science, 
Environment and Technology, 3(1), 
55-66. Retrieved from http://www.
ijset.net/journal/493.pdf
22. Diamantopoulos, A., 
Schlegelmilch, B., Sinkovics, R., & 
Bohlen, M. (2003). Can socio-
demographics still play a role in 
profiling green consumers? A 
review of the evidence and an 
empirical investigation. Journal of 
Business research, 56(6), 465-480. 
Retrieved from https://econpapers.
repec.org/article/eeejbrese/v_3-
a56_3ay_3a2003_3ai_3a6_3ap_
3a465-480.htm
23. Dienes, D., & Velte, P. (2016). The 
Impact of Supervisory Board 
Composition on CSR Reporting. 
Evidence from the German Two-
Tier System. Sustainability, MDPI, 
Open Access Journal, 8(1), 1-20. 
Retrieved from https://econpapers.
repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:8:y:
2016:i:1:p:63-:d:62004
24. Duztas, S. (2008). Corporate 
Governance the Effect of Board 
Characteristics, Information 
Technology Maturity and 
Transparency on Company 
Performance. Institute of Social 
Sciences Doctor of Philosophy 
(Management and Organization) 
İstanbul. Retrieved from http://
cgft.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/cgft.
sabanciuniv.edu/files/220577.pdf
25. Elzahar, H., & Hussainey, 
K. (2012). Determinants of 
narrative risk disclosures 
in UK interim reports. The 
Journal of Risk Finance, 
13(2), 133-147. https://doi.
org/10.1108/15265941211203189
26. Esa, E., & Ghazali, N. (2012). 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Corporate Governance in 
Malaysian Government-Linked 
Companies. Corporate Governance, 
12(3), 292-305. https://doi.
org/10.1108/14720701211234564
27. Ezhilarasi G., & Kabra, K. C. 
(2017). The impact of corporate 
governance attributes on 
environmental disclosure in 
India. India journal of corporate 
governance, 10(1) Retrieved from 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/0974686217701464
28. Fields, M. A., & Keys, P. Y. (2003). 
The Emergence of Corporate 
Governance from Wall St to Main 
St: Outside Directors, Board 
Diversity, Earnings Management 
and Managerial Incentives to Bear 
Risk. Financial Review, 38(1), 1-24. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-
6288.00032
29. Gallén, M. L., & Perait, C. (2017). 
The Relationship between 
Femininity and Sustainability 
Reporting, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 4, 1-13. https://doi.
org/10.1002/csr.1423
30. Giannetti, M., Liao, G., & Yu, 
X. (2015). The Brain Gain of 
Corporate Boards: Evidence from 
China. The Journal of Finance, 
70(4), 1629-1682. https://doi.
org/10.1111/jofi.12198
31. Gisbert, A., & Navallas, B. (2013). 
The association between voluntary 
disclosure and corporate 
governance in the presence of 
severe agency conflicts. Advances 
in Accounting, 29(2), 286-298. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adi-
ac.2013.07.001
32. Global Reporting Initiative (2011). 
Sustainability reporting guidelines. 
Retrieved from https://www.glo-
balreporting.org/resourcelibrary/
G3.1-Guidelines-Incl-Technical-
Protocol.pdf
33. Haji, A. A. (2010). The trend of 
Corporate social responsibility 
Disclosures and the Role of 
Corporate Governance Attributes: 
The Case of Shari’ah Compliant 
Companies in Malaysia. Issues 
in Social & Environmental 
Accounting, 6(3-4), 68-94. 
34. Halil, E. A. (2016). The 
relationship between board 
characteristics and environmental 
disclosure: evidence from turkey 
listed companies’ south-east. 
European journal of economics and 
business, 11(2), 7-19. https://doi.
org/10.1515/jeb-2016-0007
35. Hamid, A., & Atan, R. (2011). 
Corporate Social Responsibility by 
the Malaysian Telecommunication 
Firms. International Journal 
of Business and Social Science, 
2(5). Retrieved from http://
ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_
No._5_%5BSpecial_Issue_-_
March_2011%5D/25.pdf
36. Hidalgo, R. L., Garcia-Meca, E., 
& Martinez, I. (2011). Corporate 
governance and intellectual capital 
disclosure. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 100(3), 483-495. Retrieved 
from https://link.springer.com/ar-
ticle/10.1007/s10551-010-0692-x
37. Ismail, K., & Ibrahim, A. H. 
(2010) Social & Environmental 
Disclosure in the annual Reports 
of Jordanian Companies. Issues 
in Social & Environmental 
Accounting, 2, 198-210. Retrieved 
from https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/264048085_So-
cial_and_Environmental_Disclo-
sure_in_the_Annual_Reports_of_
Jordanian_Companies
38. Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., & Erhardt, 
N. L. (2003). Recent Research 
on Team and Organizational. 
Retrieved from www.scirp.org/
(S(lz5mqp453edsnp55rrgjct55))/
reference/ReferencesPapers.aspx?
39. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern 
industrial revolution, exit and 
the failure of internal control 
systems. The Journal of Finance, 
48(3), 831-880. Retrieved from 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.
tb04022.x
40. Kathyayini, K., Tilt, C. A., & 
Lester, L. H. (2012). Corporate 
governance and environmental 
reporting: an Australian 
study. Corporate Governance, 
12(2), 143-163. https://doi.
org/10.1108/14720701211214052
41. Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B., & 
Siddiqui, J. (2013). Corporate 
governance and corporate 
social responsibility disclosures: 
Evidence from an emerging 
economy. Journal of Business 
242
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
Ethics, 114(2), 207-223. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10551-012-1336-0
42. Khan, H. U. (2010). The effect of 
corporate governance elements 
on corporate social responsibility 
reporting: Empirical evidence 
from private commercial banks 
of Bangladesh. International 
Journal of Law and Management, 
52(2), 82-109. https://doi.
org/10.1108/17542431011029406
43. Kılıç, M., Kuzey, C., & Uyar, A. 
(2015). The Impact of Ownership 
and Board Structure on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Reporting in the Turkish Banking 
Industry. Corporate Governance, 
15(3), 357-374. https://doi.
org/10.1108/CG-02-2014-0022 
44. Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V., & 
Erkut, S. (2008). Critical mass: 
The impact of three or more 
women on corporate boards. 
Organizational Dynamics, 37(2), 
145-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
orgdyn.2008.02.005
45. Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. 
(1970). Determining Sample Size 
for search Activities. Educational 
and psychological measurement, 
30, 607-610. https://doi.
org/10.1177/001316447003000308
46. Kruger, P. (2010). Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Board of 
Directors. Retrieved from https://
www.sfgeneva.org/doc/110317_
kruegerCsrandBoard.pdf
47. Larmou, S., & Vafeas, N. (2010). 
The relation between board 
size and firm performance in 
firms with a history of poor 
operating performance. Journal 
of Management & Governance, 
14(1), 61-85. Retrieved from 
https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007%2Fs10997-009-
9091-z
48. Liao, L., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. 
(2014). Gender diversity, board 
independence, environmental 
committee and greenhouse gas 
disclosure. The British Accounting 
Review, 47, 409-424. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.01.002
49. Lilik H., Bambang, S., Sutrisna, T., 
& Erwin, S. (2014). Does Board 
Diversity Matter on Corporate 
Social Disclosure: An Indonesian 
Evidence. Journal of economics 
and sustainable development, 9(4).
50. Lynall, M., Golden, B., & Hilman, 
A. (2003). Board Composition 
from Adolescence to Maturity: A 
Multi-theoretic view. The Academy 
of Management Review, 28(3), 
416-431. https://doi.org/10.5465/
amr.2003.10196743
51. MacKenzie, C. (2007). Boards, 
incentives and corporate social 
responsibility: the case for a 
change of emphasis. Corporate 
Governance: An International 
Review, 15(5), 935-943. Retrieved 
from https://econpapers.repec.org/
RePEc:bla:corgov:v:15:y:2007:i:5
:p:935-943
52. Mclkenny, P., & Ben-Amar, W. 
(2015). Board effectiveness and 
voluntary disclosure of climate 
change information. Business 
Strategy and the Environment, 
24(8), 704-719. https://doi.
org/10.1002/bse.1840
53. Mgbame, C. O. (2012). 
Environmental accounting audit 
in selected companies in Nigeria 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
submitted to the University of 
Benin). Retrieved from http://
www.sapub.org/global/show-
paperpdf.aspx?doi=10.5923/j.
ijfa.20150403.01
54. Michelle, P. S. (2016). Corporate 
Environmental Disclosure 
in Malaysian Public Listed 
Companies Msc Thesis Curtin 
University. Diversity: SWOT 
Analysis and Implications. Journal 
of Management, 29, 801-830.
55. Mohamad, W. W., & Sulong, Z. 
(2010). Corporate governance 
mechanisms and extent of 
disclosure: Evidence from 
listed companies in Malaysia. 
International Business Research, 
3(4), 216-228. https://doi.
org/10.5539/ibr.v3n4p216
56. Mullen, E. (2011). Women in 
leadership promote corporate 
social responsibility. Retrieved 
from https://www.nacdonline.org/
insights/magazine/ (accessed on 
December 2012).
57. Natividad, I. (2005). Women 
directors and the global company. 
Directors Monthly, March 13-15. 
58. Ntim, C. G., Lindop, S., & 
Thomas, D. A. (2013). corporate 
governance and risk reporting in 
South Africa: A study of corporate 
risk disclosures in the pre-and 
post-2007/2008 global financial 
crisis periods. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 
363-383. Retrieved from https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.
cfm?abstractid=2289521
59. Osariemen, A., Edosa, J. A., 
Uwuigbe, U., & Uwuigbe, O. R. 
(2018). Audit committee attributes 
and audit quality: a benchmark 
analysis. Business: Theory and 
Practice, 19, 37-48. https://doi.
org/10.3846/btp.2018.05
60. Olubukola, R. U., Uwuigbe, 
U., Jimoh, J., Ebeguki, E. I., & 
Olufemi, A. O. (2016). Value 
relevance of financial statements 
and share price: a study of listed 
banks in Nigeria. Banks and Bank 
Systems, 11(4), 135-143. Retrieved 
from http://eprints.covenantuni-
versity.edu.ng/8431/1/Value_rel-
evance_of_financial_statements_
share_pric.pdf
61. Othman, R., & Rashid, A. 
(2009). Corporate social and 
environmental reporting: Where 
are we heading? A survey of the 
literature. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Governance, 6(4), 
298-320. 
62. Oyeshola, D. (2008). Sustainable 
development: issues and 
challenges for Nigeria. Daily 
Graphic Nigeria book. Retrieved 
from https://searchworks.stanford.
edu/view/10457029
63. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 
(1978). The External Control 
of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York, 
NY, Harper and Row. Retrieved 
from https://www.journals.uchi-
cago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/227517
64. Pramanik, A. K., Shil, N. C., 
& Das, B. (2008). Corporate 
Environmental Reporting: An 
Emerging Issue in the Corporate 
World. International Journal of 
Business and Management, 3(12), 
146-154. https://doi.org/10.5539/
ijbm.v3n12p146
65. Rahman, N., & Post, C. 
(2012). Measurement issues in 
243
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
environmental corporate social 
responsibility ECSR): toward a 
transparent, reliable and construct 
valid instrument. Journal of 
Business Ethic, 105(3), 307-319. 
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.
org/stable/41413219?seq=1#page_
scan_tab_contents
66. Rose, C. (2007). Does female 
board representation influence 
firm performance? The Danish 
evidence. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 15(2), 
404-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-8683.2007.00570.x
67. Rouf, M. (2011). Corporate 
characteristics, governance 
attributes and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in 
Bangladesh. African Journal of 
Business Management, 5(19), 
7836-7845. 
68. Sadis, M., Tariq, A., & Saba, S. 
(2015). The Effect of Corporate 
Governance Elements on 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) Disclosure in Pakistan. 
Int. J. Financial Stud, 3(4), 530-
556. https://doi.org/10.3390/
ijfs3040530
69. Saha, A. K., & Akter, S. 
(2013). Relationship between 
environmental reporting 
in corporate annual reports 
& corporate profitability in 
Bangladesh. Global Conference on 
Business & Finance Proceedings, 
8(1), 75-86. 
70. Schneider, T. E. (2010). Is 
environmental performance a 
determinant of bond pricing? 
Evidence from the U.S. pulp and 
paper and chemical industries 
(Working Paper). Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1299761
71. Selsky, J. W., & Parker, B. (2005). 
Cross-Sector Partnerships to 
Address Social Issues: Challenges 
to Theory and Practice. Journal 
of Management, 31(6), 849-873. 
Retrieved from https://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/
s10551-011-0776-2
72. Sharfman, M., & Fernando, 
C. (2008). Environmental risk 
management and the cost of 
capital. Strategic management 
journal, 29, 569-592. https://doi.
org/10.1002/smj.678
73. Sharif, M., & Rashid, K. (2014). 
Corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) reporting: an empirical 
evidence from commercial banks 
(CB) of Pakistan. Quality & 
Quantity, 48(5), 2501-2521. 
74. Strandberg, C. (2005). The 
convergence of corporate 
governance and corporate social 
responsibility: Though-Leader 
Study. Retrieved from www.
corostranberg.com
75. Sun, N., Salama, A., Hussainey, 
K., & Habbash, M. (2010). 
Corporate environmental 
disclosure, corporate governance 
and earnings management. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 
25(7), 679-700. https://doi.
org/10.1108/02686901011061351
76. Tareq, B., Reza, K., & Aminu, H. 
(2017). The impact of corporate 
characteristics on social and 
environmental disclosure: 
The case of Jordan. Journal 
of Accounting and Auditing; 
Research and Practice, 29. https://
doi.org/10.5171/2017.369352
77. Thompson, P., & Zarina, Z. 
(2004). Corporate social 
responsibility reporting in 
Malaysia. Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship, 13, 125-136.
78. Uwuigbe, U. N., Egbide, B. C., 
& Ayokunle, A. M. (2011). The 
effect of board size and board 
composition on firm’s corporate 
environmental disclosure: a study 
of selected firms in Nigeria. Acta 
Universitatis Danubius, 7(5), 164-
176. Retrieved from http://jour-
nals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/
oeconomica/article/view/1095
79. Uwuigbe, U., Agba, L. U., 
Jimoh, J., Olubukunola, R. 
U., & Rehimetu, J. (2017). 
IFRS adoption and earnings 
predictability: evidence from 
listed banks in Nigeria. Banks 
and Bank Systems, 12(1), 166-
174. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/
bbs.12(1-1).2017.10
80. Uwuigbe, U., Olusanmi, O., & 
Iyoha, F. (2015). The Effects 
of Corporate Governance 
Mechanism on Firms Dividend 
Pay-out Policy in Nigeria. Journal 
of accounting and auditing: 
research & practice. https://doi.
org/10.5171/2015.313679
244
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2018
APPENDIX A
Table A1. Regression result for panel data
Source: Calculated by the researchers using the E-VIEWS 9 (2016).
Dependent variable: CSEDI
Method: panel least squares
Date: 05/10/18. Time: 22:40
Sample: 2012 2016
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 17
Total panel (balanced) observations: 85
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic Prob.
BSIZE 0.062542 0.007902 7.914699 0.0000
FD_ 0.264178 0.106705 2.475776 0.0155
GENDER_ 0.901495 0.132201 6.819119 0.0000
C –0.354971 0.098411 –3.607011 0.0005
Effects specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.562567 Mean dependent var 0.545752
Adjusted R-squared 0.522800 S.D. dependent var 0.270429
S.E. of regression 0.186811 Akaike info criterion –0.428047
Sum squared resid 2.687179 Schwarz criterion –0.198150
Log likelihood 26.19199 Hannan-Quinn critter –0.335576
F-statistic 14.14671 Durbin-Watson stat 0.408366
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 – –
Dependent variable: CSEDI
Method: panel EGLS (period random effects)
Date: 05/10/18. Time: 22:42
Sample: 2012–2016
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 17
Total panel (balanced) observations: 85
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. error T-statistic Prob.
BSIZE 0.060756 0.007841 7.749015 0.0000
FD_ 0.241031 0.105780 2.278614 0.0253
GENDER_ 0.866844 0.130461 6.644484 0.0000
C –0.322695 0.096829 –3.332628 0.0013
Effects specification
S.D. Rho
Period random 0.000000 0.0000
Idiosyncratic random 0.186811 1.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.543172 Mean dependent var 0.545752
Adjusted R-squared 0.526252 S.D. dependent var 0.270429
S.E. of regression 0.186134 Sum squared resid 2.806325
F-statistic 32.10318 Durbin-Watson stat 0.386051
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 – –
Unweighted statistics
R-squared 0.543172 Mean dependent var 0.545752
Sum squared resid 2.806325 Durbin-Watson stat 0.386051
